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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4444 
___________ 
 
GERALD BUSH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-02612) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 1, 2012 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES AND WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 12, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Gerald Bush, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s orders 
dismissing his civil rights action and denying his requests for appointment of counsel.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings. 
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I. 
In April 2011, Bush commenced a civil rights action on behalf of himself, his 
minor daughter, Amirah, and his granddaughter, against the Department of Human 
Services (“DHS”), Supervisor of DHS, Social Worker Benten, the City of Philadelphia, 
and Saint Vincent’s shelter.  In the complaint, Bush alleged that in February 2011, 
Benten removed Amirah and her daughter from his care after threatening him and 
Amirah to agree to a safety plan.  Bush stated that Amirah and her daughter were 
eventually placed at Saint Vincent’s shelter, where Amirah’s daughter suffered a skull 
injury.  Bush also stated that he did not receive a post-deprivation hearing until six-weeks 
after his daughter and granddaughter were removed.  Therefore, Bush claimed that 
defendants had violated his right to procedural due process under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
6332 for failing to timely hold a post-deprivation hearing, and his and Amirah’s right to 
substantive due process by improperly obtaining consent to a safety plan through duress 
and by failing to properly care for his granddaughter. 
Background 
The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and ordered the case 
closed, but gave Bush 30 days to retain an attorney for his daughter and granddaughter, 
and to file an amended complaint containing only his claims against defendants.  The 
District Court subsequently granted Bush’s motion for an extension of time to obtain 
counsel, and sua sponte extended the time period for Bush to file an amended complaint 
to June 16, 2011.  Bush was unable to obtain counsel for Amirah, his granddaughter, or 
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himself, and filed a several requests for appointment of counsel, which the District Court 
denied.   
In July 2011, Bush filed an amended complaint, in which he named only himself 
as plaintiff and only the City of Philadelphia and DHS as defendants.  In his amended 
complaint and subsequent documents, Bush claimed that defendants retaliated against 
him for filing his initial April 2011 complaint by instigating an investigation concerning 
another daughter of his, Niara, and removing her from his care based on allegations of 
child abuse that were later determined to be unfounded.  Bush also alleged that his right 
to procedural due process was violated when the Court of Common Pleas refused to grant 
his request for a continuance at Niara’s dependency hearing.  It also appears that Bush 
restated arguments concerning Amirah that he made in his initial complaint. 
By orders entered December 7 and 13, 2011,1 the District Court sua sponte entered 
final judgment against Bush,2
                                              
 1 The District Court filed identical orders. 
 noting that Bush’s amended complaint was untimely filed 
since it had ordered that an amended complaint be filed by June 16, 2011.  The District 
Court did not specify the authority it was relying on to enter final judgment against Bush.  
It appears that it exercised its authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), and dismissed the 
 
 2 Defendants had yet to enter an appearance in District Court, and have not entered 
an appearance with this Court. 
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case for Bush’s failure to comply with a court order.3
II. 
  Bush timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a District Court’s 
dismissal for failure to comply with court orders, as well as a denial of a request for 
appointment of counsel, for abuse of discretion.  
Discussion 
See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 
184, 190 (3d Cir. 2003); Tabron v. Grace
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), a district court may dismiss an action sua sponte if a 
plaintiff fails to comply with a court order.  
, 6 F.3d 147, 155 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993). 
See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 
630-31 (1962).  Before dismissing the action, the district court must first consider and 
balance the six factors under Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.
                                              
 3 In a footnote, the District Court also stated that “[i]n an effort to maintain 
consistency in the face of [Bush’s] voluminous litigation, the Court has enforced its order 
and this action remains closed following [Bush’s] untimely filing,” citing several civil 
rights actions Bush previously filed.  The intention of this statement is unclear.  Review 
of the cases cited by the District Court shows that Bush filed a series of duplicative 
complaints claiming false arrest and/or malicious prosecution.  See E.D. Pa. Nos. 09-
4798, 10-640, 10-1104.  As a result, in September 2010, the District Court enjoined Bush 
from filing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without leave of the Court.  E.D. Pa. No. 10-
1104.  The injunction, which we upheld, also requires Bush to certify that the claims he 
wishes to present have never before been raised and disposed of on the merits by any 
federal courts.  Id.; C.A. No. 10-4282.  The District Court may have precluded Bush’s 
amended complaint based on the injunction.  However, the District Court’s actions are 
unclear, as the District Court was not explicit in its order and did not require the requisite 
certification when Bush filed his original complaint in this case. 
, 747 F.2d 863, 868 
(3d Cir. 1984): (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to 
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the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders; (3) a history of 
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party was willful or in bad faith; (5) the 
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim.  
See United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Because an order of dismissal is a harsh remedy that deprives a party of its day in court, 
we have stated that “a court should resort to [dismissal] only in extreme cases, as ‘the 
policy of the law is to favor the hearing of a litigant’s claim on the merits.’”  Spain v. 
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 918 
(3d Cir. 1974)); see Adams v. Trustees of the N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust 
Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 876 (3d Cir. 1994).  However, in extraordinary cases, such as when a 
plaintiff acts contumaciously after the district court warns him that the case may be 
dismissed for noncompliance, a district court may dismiss a case without analyzing the 
Poulis factors.  See, e.g., Spain, 26 F.3d at 455; Guyer v. Beard
Here, the District Court dismissed Bush’s suit with prejudice without warning 
Bush of possible dismissal and without mentioning the 
, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429-30. 
Poulis factors.4
                                              
 4 We do not undertake the task of balancing the Poulis factors in the first instance, 
“as it would require factual findings not within the parameters of our review.”  Livera v. 
First Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1989). 
  Additionally, the 
record does not suggest that this in an extraordinary case in which Bush acted 
contumaciously.  We therefore conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in 
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dismissing Bush’s suit.   
We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Bush’s requests for appointment of counsel.  Bush requested appointment of counsel at 
an early stage of the proceedings, when it was premature to determine whether Bush’s 
claims had arguable merit or whether additional factors warranted appointing counsel.  
See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-56.5
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm in part, vacate in part and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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 5 The District Court properly dismissed the claims Bush asserted on behalf of his 
minor daughter and granddaughter, as Bush may not act as “pro se counsel” for them.  
See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (minors may 
not proceed pro se or be represented by non-attorney parent).  It also did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Bush’s request to appoint counsel for his daughter and 
granddaughter.  See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-56. 
 
 6 Bush’s motions to file an amendment in support his brief are granted, and we 
have considered his amendments in reaching our decision.  Bush’s motions to enter 
default judgment, motion to appoint a special master, and motion to compel arbitration, 
for summary judgment, and for appointment of counsel for arbitration are denied.  The 
document entitled “Violation of Federal Rule[] of Civil Procedure Rule 
37[(b)](2)(A)(vi)(vii) [for] Sanctions . . . and Oral Argument [under] Fed. R. [App.] P. 
34” appears to be a motion requesting oral argument and requesting that this Court 
sanction Appellees for not filing a brief.  This motion is also denied. 
